Rate and give feedback:  Feedback Received. Thank You!

Rate and give feedback: 

X

This document helped resolve my issue

Yes No

Additional Comments

800 characters remaining

May we contact you if necessary?

Name:  

E-mail: 

Enter a valid Email ID

Need product assistance? Contact Juniper Support

Submit

This site is protected by hCaptcha and its Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

English  

English

Understanding Route Authentication

The use of router and route authentication and route integrity greatly mitigates the risk of being attacked by a machine or router that has been configured to share incorrect routing information with another router. In this kind of attack, the attacked router can be tricked into creating a routing loop, or the attacked router’s routing table can be greatly increased thus impacting performance, or routing information can be redirected to a place in the network for the attacker to analyze it. Bogus route advertisements can be sent out on a segment. These updates can be accepted into the routing tables of neighbor routers unless an authentication mechanism is in place to verify the source of the routes.

Router and route authentication enables routers to share information only if they can verify that they are talking to a trusted source, based on a password (key). In this method, a hashed key is sent along with the route being sent to another router. The receiving router compares the sent key to its own configured key. If they are the same, it accepts the route. By using a hashing algorithm, the key is not sent over the wire in plain text. Instead, a hash is calculated using the configured key. The routing update is used as the input text, along with the key, into the hashing function. This hash is sent along with the route update to the receiving router. The receiving router compares the received hash with a hash it generates on the route update using the preshared key configured on it. If the two hashes are the same, the route is assumed to be from a trusted source. The key is known only to the sending and receiving routers.

To further strengthen security, you can configure a series of authentication keys (a keychain). Each key has a unique start time within the keychain. Keychain authentication allows you to change the password information periodically without bringing down peering sessions. This keychain authentication method is referred to as hitless because the keys roll over from one to the next without resetting any peering sessions or interrupting the routing protocol.

• The start time is less than or equal to the current time (in other words, not in the future).
• The start time is greater than that of all other keys in the chain whose start time is less than the current time (in other words, closest to the current time).

The receiving peer determines the key with which it authenticates based on the incoming key identifier.

The sending peer identifies the current authentication key based on a configured start time and then generates a hash value using the current key. The sending peer then inserts a TCP-enhanced authentication option object into the BGP update message. The object contains an object ID (assigned by IANA), the object length, the current key, and a hash value.

The receiving peer examines the incoming TCP-enhanced authentication option, looks up the received authentication key, and determines whether the key is acceptable based on the start time, the system time, and the tolerance parameter. If the key is accepted, the receiving peer calculates a hash and authenticates the update message.

Initial application of a keychain to a TCP session causes the session to reset. However, once the keychain is applied, the addition or removal of a password from the keychain does not cause the TCP session to reset. Also, the TCP session does not reset when the keychain changes from one authentication algorithm to another.